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PREVIEW; Cross v. Warren:  
Can Injured Third-Parties Stack Liability Insurance? 
 
Elliott McGill 
 
 
The Montana Supreme Court Oral Argument is scheduled for 
Friday, September 21, 2018 at 10:00 a.m. at the Red Lion Hotel in 
Kalispell, Montana. Colin Gerstner is expected to argue on behalf of 
the Appellants, and Susan Moriarty Miltko is expected to argue on 
behalf of Appellees.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 This case concerns third-party motor vehicle liability 
insurance and whether it can be “stacked” under Montana law. 
Kenneth Cross, Henley Brady, and Roland Redfield (collectively 
“Appellants”) sustained injuries in a motor vehicle collision.1 The 
at-fault driver, Taylor Warren, was insured under a liability policy 
issued by Progressive.2 The policy covering the truck Taylor was 
driving at the time of the accident was covered under one of four 
liability policies the Warren family purchased to cover their four 
vehicles individually.3 The Appellants argue that each of the 
Warrens’ four Progressive policies should be “stacked” to allow 
recovery beyond the “per person” limit provided the individual 
Progressive policy.4 Taylor Warren, his parents, and Progressive 
(collectively “Appellees”) respond that Montana law prevents 
stacking multiple third-party liability policies, and in the alternative, 
even if stacking of the coverage is allowed, Progressive satisfied the 
statutory requirements necessary to prevent Appellants from doing 
so.5 
 
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
 On January 8, 2015, Taylor Warren crashed his parents’ 
                                                          
1 Appellant’s Opening Brief at 2, Cross v. Warren, 
https://supremecourtdocket.mt.gov/APP/connector/9/368/url/321Z246_03WCC
VM23005BKE.pdf. (Mont. Feb. 7, 2018) (No. DA 17-0599). 
2 Id.  
3 Appellee’s Answer Brief, Cross v. Warren, 
https://supremecourtdocket.mt.gov/APP/connector/8/367/url/321Z24D_040WF
TGRV0007EX.pdf. (Mont. Apr. 9, 2018) (No. DA 17-0599).  
4 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 2–3.  
5 Appellee’s Answer Brief, supra note 3, at 6–7.  
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GMC pickup truck into Appellants’ vehicle, seriously injuring 
them.6 Warren was insured through Progressive under policies held 
by his parents, Robert and Sherle Warren.7 The liability policy 
covering the Taylor’s GMC truck had “$100,000 per 
person/$300,000 aggregate coverage limits,” as did three other 
policies the Warrens purchased from Progressive to cover their 
additional vehicles.8 The Warrens paid separate premiums for each 
of the four policies.9 Progressive paid each injured Appellant 
$100,000, the “per person” limit on the GMC policy, but it denied 
Appellants’ request to stack the liability limits on all four 
Progressive policies—stacking would have allowed Appellants to 
recover $1,200,000 from Progressive.10  
 Progressive submitted rate filings to the Montana 
Commissioner of Insurance in early 2011 which included the 
information used by Progressive to determine the premiums for each 
policy held by the Warrens.11 Appellants agree that Montana Code 
Annotated § 33–23–203(1)(c) allows an insurer to prevent stacking 
if it shows their premiums “actuarially reflect the limiting of 
coverage separately to the vehicles covered by the policy,”  but 
argue that Progressive failed to satisfy the requirement in its 
submitted filings.12 Additionally, Appellees point out that the 
language of the GMC policy unambiguously and specifically 
provides that the Warrens’ multiple policies cannot be stacked.13  
 The Twenty-Second Judicial District Court, Big Horn 
County, granted Progressive’s motion for summary judgment.14 The 
district court did not apply Section 33–23–203 in reaching its 
decision,15 but nevertheless held that Montana law prohibits the 
stacking of liability coverage.16 First, the court determined that first-
party automobile insurance policies which protect the policyholder 
(e.g., Uninsured Motorist Coverage (UIM), Underinsured Motorist 
Coverage (UM), and Medical Payments Coverage (MP)) are 
inherently different from third-party coverages like the one issued 
for Warren’s GMC.17 Second, the district court reasoned that under 
                                                          
6 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 2.  
7 Id.  
8 Id.  
9 Id.  
10 Appellee’s Answer Brief, supra note 3, at 2.  
11 Id.  
12 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 29–30.  
13 Appellee’s Answer Brief, supra note 3, at 42. 
14 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 3.  
15 Id. 
16 Appellee’s Answer Brief, supra note 3, at 2. 
17 Id. at 19. 
2018 PREVIEW: CROSS V. WARREN  50 
 
Montana law, stacking is only available to named insureds on an 
insurance policy.18 Third, the court decided that third-party liability 
coverage is not “personal and portable” and is therefore not 
stackable.19 The district court concluded that preventing third-
parties from stacking multiple liability policies does not render the 
coverage illusory.20  
 The resolution of this case will likely hinge on the Montana 
Supreme Court’s interpretation and application of Section 33–23–
203. The Montana Supreme Court must determine: 1) whether 
Section 33–23–203 applies to third parties, and whether it requires 
stacking or is merely applicable in stacking cases; and 2) whether 
Progressive met the statutory filing requirements, thereby 
permitting it to refuse to stack the policies. 
 
II.  SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
 
A. Appellants’ Argument 
 
 Appellants argue that the district court erred by not applying 
Section 33–23–203 in reaching its decision.21 They contend that 
since its amendment in 2007, Section 33–23–203 has shifted from 
an anti-stacking statute to a pro-stacking statute that no longer 
differentiates between so-called first-party and third-party 
coverages.22 Additionally, Appellants assert that modern liability 
policies are “personal and portable,” so courts should no longer be 
misled by “the so-called first-party/third-party distinction.”23 
 Appellants also argue that Progressive failed to satisfy the 
filing requirements set forth by Section 33–23–203(1)(c).24 Section 
33–23–203(1)(c) requires an insurer to file its rates with the 
Commissioner of Insurance and requires the rates to “actuarily 
reflect” the limiting of coverage to each separate vehicle covered by 
a policy. Appellants contend that Progressive failed to satisfy both 
requirements.25 First, Appellants assert that the rates cannot 
actuarily reflect the limiting of coverage, because the Warrens’ 
liability coverage was not limited to specific covered autos under 
their policies; instead, it was “personal and portable,” therefore 
                                                          
18 Id.  
19 Id. at 20. 
20 Id.  
21 Id. at 23. 
22 Id. at 27.  
23 Id. at 26.  
24 Id. at 27 
25 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 29, 34. 
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preventing any actuarial reflection that the premiums paid were 
limited to the specific automobiles in the Warrens’ policies.26 
Otherwise, the liability coverage would be rendered illusory; the 
Warrens paid valuable consideration for each of the policies and 
should be entitled to stack the benefits of each.27 Second, Appellants 
argue that Progressive failed to satisfy the filing requirements of the 
statute, because it did not provide “actuarial certifications relative to 
its bodily injury liability policies.”28 
 Finally, Appellants contend that the district court erred in 
concluding that stacking is only available to parties who are 
“insureds,” as defined in the GMC policy.29 Appellants concede that 
they do not fit the policy’s definition of “insured,” but assert that 
they should be entitled to stacking privileges nonetheless.30 Since 
Taylor Warren was an “insured” under the Progressive policy, and 
since Montana courts recognize instances where third-parties may 
seek compensation directly from insureds (e.g., declaratory actions, 
actions under the Unfair Trade Practices Act, etc.), Appellants argue 
that they are entitled to stacking benefits.31 
 
B.  Appellee’s Argument  
 
 Appellees rebut the claim that Section 33–23–203 requires 
stacking of any type of insurance coverage, much less liability 
coverage.32 Even if the Court decides Section 33–23–203 can be 
applied to third party liability coverage, Appellees argue that the 
statute’s plain language does not require stacking.33 Additionally, 
Appellees point to the legislative history of Section 33–23–203 to 
support the notion that the Montana Legislature intended for the 
statute to prevent stacking, not require it.34  Further, Appellees assert 
that the absence of any stacking requirement under Section 33–23–
203 is consistent with the Legislature’s decision to set mandatory 
stacking limits; holding otherwise would “effectively mandate” 
excess liability coverage for any Montanan who owns more than one 
vehicle.35 
                                                          
26 Id. at 33.  
27 Id. at 31.  
28 Id. at 35.  
29 Id. at 35.  
30 Id.  
31 Id. at 42–43.  
32 Appellee’s Answer Brief, supra note 3, at 7.  
33 Id. at 8.  
34 Id. at 11.  
35 Id. at 14.  
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 Second, Appellees argue that since Appellants are not 
“insureds” under any of the Warrens’ policies, they had no 
reasonable expectations that the Warrens would carry any coverage 
beyond the minimum requirements set by Montana law.36 Appellees 
respond to Appellants’ claim that stacking should be permitted due 
to Taylor Warren’s status as an “insured” by pointing to evidence 
that the Warrens themselves did not expect their multiple liability 
policies to stack and, therefore, Taylor Warren’s “insured” status is 
not grounds for stacking the policies.37 
 Third, Appellees argue that liability coverage cannot be 
“personal and portable,” because it is tied to a specific vehicle or its 
replacement and is required under Montana law.38 Additionally, 
Appellees contend that the Warrens’ liability coverage is not 
illusory, as demonstrated by the fact that Progressive paid $300,000 
under the GMC policy—the maximum amount listed in the policy.39 
 Finally, Appellees assert that even if the Court holds that 
Section 33–23–203 requires stacking of liability coverage, 
Progressive met the statutory requirement to properly refuse 
stacking.40 Appellees argue that the following facts demonstrate its 
statutory compliance: 1) Progressive’s premiums actuarily reflect 
the limiting of coverage to specific vehicles, because Progressive 
does not include stacked exposure in its calculations of premiums; 
2) Progressive filed the rates with the Commissioner of Insurance; 
and 3) the policy language of the Warrens’ policies unambiguously 
state that coverage is limited to each insured vehicle and cannot be 
stacked.41 
 
IV. ANALYSIS 
 
 A critical decision for the Montana Supreme Court is 
whether Section 33–23–203 requires or allows stacking third-party 
insurance coverage. Both parties agree that the current statute 
embodies the Court’s holding in Hardy v. Progressive Specialty Ins. 
Co.42 In Hardy, the Court applied the pre-2007 version of Section 
33–23–203 to a case involving an injured first-party Plaintiff who 
sought to stack his multiple UIM policies.43 Applying the then-
                                                          
36 Id. at 23.  
37 Id. at 25.  
38 Id. at 29.  
39 Id. at 34-35. 
40 Id. at 35.  
41 Id. at 35, 38, and 42.  
42 2003 MT 85, 315 Mont. 107, 67 P.3d 892.  
43 Id., ¶ 7.  
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existing statute, which prohibited stacking completely, the Court 
held that the statute as it existed was unconstitutional “to the extent 
that it allows charging premiums for illusory coverage.”44 The 
Court’s  holding, followed by the Legislature’s codification of it in 
the 2007 amendment to Section 33–23–203, seems to bolster 
Appellees’ argument that only first-parties can stack multiple 
policies under Montana law.45 If nothing else, Hardy seems to at 
least require third-parties to prove liability coverages are illusory 
before successfully stacking them. If the Court reads Hardy and the 
statute to permit third parties to stack multiple liability policies, it 
will adopt Appellants’ argument that the statute transformed from a 
pre-Hardy stacking ban into a post-Hardy stacking requirement, 
allowing insurers to deny coverage only as provided in Section 33–
23–203(1)(c).  
 If the Court holds that stacking of liability coverage is 
available at all under Section 33–23–203, another critical 
determination is whether Progressive met the requirements set by 
Section 33–23–203(1)(c) in refusing to stack the Warrens’ four 
policies. Progressive filed its premiums with the Commissioner of 
Insurance and provided affidavits to prove that its calculations of 
premiums were not based on stacked exposure.46 Therefore, the 
Court must decide whether Progressive’s filings were sufficient, or 
whether, as Appellants argue, insurers must provide additional 
actuarial certification along with filings of their premiums on 
liability coverages.47 A ruling in Appellants’ favor on this issue 
would not only require insurers to file additional documents, but it 
would also likely change the way rates are calculated. Permitting 
stacking in this case would require insurers to consider stacking 
exposure in calculating insurance rates—a consideration which 
could ultimately lead to higher premiums for Montanans.  
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
 This case presents the Court with difficult legal questions 
that implicate statewide economic and social policies. For 
individuals, the Court’s decision will determine whether third 
parties can stack multiple liability coverages to pay their medical 
bills after injuries. For insurers, the Court will decide the scope of 
stacking and whether insurers are able to limit exposure therefrom. 
                                                          
44 Id., ¶ 38.  
45 Appellee’s Answer Brief, supra note 3, at 5. 
46 Id. at 38.  
47 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 35.  
